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From: 10 August 1950
To : 16 August 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.
17 August 1950

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1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

- a. The Soviet Union is in an advanced stage of preparation for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Reliable intelligence on Soviet intentions to go to war in the near future is lacking.
- b. Indications are lacking of an immediate intent to reinforce North Korean ground forces from outside North Korea but additional air support for North Korea may be forthcoming.
- c. Available information does not indicate preparations for an imminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan); weather conditions for such an attack are normally favorable only through mid-September.
- d. Recent indications point to a continuation of Soviet preparedness measures in Europe and to growing Viet Minh capabilities in Indo-China.

2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. Summary.--Limited reconnaissance has revealed no concentrations for attack on Formosa (Taiwan). There is no reliable evidence of a movement of Chinese Communist forces into Korea. Viet Minh preparations for larger scale operations continue. There is no evidence of a change in the disposition of Soviet forces in Europe but larger scale maneuvers are expected shortly. Petroleum conservation measures are apparently not necessitated by lagging production. The U.S.S.R. is tightening its political control in Austria and seeking a trade agreement with Iran.
- b. Operations of enemy component elements.

- (1) KOREA.--See current situation reports. There is no reliable evidence of a movement of Chinese Communist units into Korea but additional air support may soon be furnished the North Koreans.

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- (2) CHINA.--Limited reconnaissance and other sources have revealed no preparations for an imminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan) though such an attack could be mounted within a period of a few days. Airfield improvements in China are continuing. Harassment of shipping in the Hong Kong area may be intended to make the British position untenable without direct attack.
 - (3) INDO-CHINA.--French concern over the growing capabilities of the Viet Minh is increasing, and a Viet Minh offensive may be initiated at any time after 1 September.
 - (4) EUROPE.--Larger scale Soviet maneuvers in Germany are expected shortly though there is as yet no indication of a change in the disposition of Soviet forces. There has been renewed Communist propaganda against U. S. air activities in Germany. There are unconfirmed reports of a concentration of troops in Soviet or Rumanian Bucovina. Despite indications of unusual conservation of fuel supplies, Soviet oil production at Baku and in Austria is increasing. The Soviets are attempting to tighten their political control in Austria.
 - (5) NEAR EAST.--The Soviets are making friendly gestures towards Iran, apparently in an attempt to obtain trade concessions.
3. See Tab "A" attached.
4. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--Viet Minh capabilities are continuing to increase. North Korean air capabilities may soon be increased. Capabilities in other areas remain essentially unchanged.

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TAB "A"

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO GO TO WAR IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
16 August 1950

1. Soviet Intentions in the Far East.

a. Available information indicates no current preparations for an imminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan). Troops and material are so located, however, that their loading for an attack could be accomplished in three to four days. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LST's and other craft had been armed and fitted out in Shanghai but that there were no signs of their departure or of final preparations for a movement of craft or troops. Limited U.S. Naval reconnaissance has continued to reveal no unusual concentrations or movements of shipping on the Fukien coast, although possible concentrations in estuaries cannot be observed. Nationalist sources also have not reported any indications of preparations for an immediate attack on Formosa (Taiwan). There have been reports, however, of continuing improvement and extension of airfields on the Fukien coast. The Nationalists have also reported that a Soviet air division was moved to Central China during early August and that orated jet aircraft are being shipped to Foochow. Although this report is not confirmed, the presence of Soviet air units in China has been previously accepted and there are indications of Soviet bombers, as well as fighters, in China. The several recent reports that the U.S.S.R. is turning over submarines to the Chinese Communists are without confirmation.

b. There continues to be no reliable evidence of the movement of Chinese Communist units into Korea. Korean troops, formerly attached to the Chinese Communist Army, are reported to have stated recently that no Chinese Communist unit as such is in Korea. Two Japanese who recently escaped from the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army have confirmed that the Korean elements of that field army, with full equipment, were transferred to Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities. There are indications that air opposition may soon be encountered in Korea. It is possible, though not confirmed, that some aircraft now in China are being transferred to Korea.

c. In Indo-China, French concern over the growing capabilities of the Viet Minh is increasing. The French are particularly worried about reported large-scale Chinese Communist training and re-equipping of Viet Minh personnel on Chinese soil, and have confirmed the presence of two Soviet observers during a recent Viet Minh attack on a French border post. Since the intention of the Viet Minh to launch a general

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offensive is accepted and their capabilities are increasing rapidly, it is estimated that a Viet Minh offensive may be initiated at any time after 1 September 1950. The initial phase of this operation, which is expected to include clandestine Chinese Communist participation, will probably be the systematic reduction of French border posts.

d. There continues to be no indication of an imminent Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong. Persistent firing on merchant shipping just outside the Hong Kong harbor, however, has demonstrated that Hong Kong is nearly surrounded by Communist artillery capable of firing on the island.

e. Soviet efforts to change the wording of the proceedings of the UN Security Council have indicated an attempt to tone down Malik's original statement that the Chinese and Korean questions are "closely and indissolubly linked" to a statement that they are "connected questions." While it has been suggested that this may indicate Soviet preparations to accept a settlement on Korea, it appears more probable that it is in preparation for continued Soviet efforts to secure the representation of Communist China in the UN, with or without direct connection to the Korean question.

f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Available information does not indicate preparations for an imminent attack on Formosa (Taiwan) but the loading for an attack could be accomplished in three to four days.
- (2) There are indications that North Korean air capabilities may soon be augmented, but there is no evidence of an immediate intent to reinforce North Korean ground forces from outside North Korea.
- (3) There are continuing indications of growing Viet Minh capabilities and of probable Viet Minh operations on an enlarged scale in the near future.
- (4) Harassment of shipping in the Hong Kong area may be intended to make the British position untenable without direct attack.

2. Soviet Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. In Germany, there has been no indication of change in the disposition of Soviet troops in maneuver areas but it is expected that large-scale maneuvers will begin shortly.

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b. A new development in the propaganda campaign against alleged U. S. illicit air activities in Germany was a Soviet protest that a U.S. plane had dropped an incendiary object over the Soviet Zone. The East German radio followed this with the statement that the Ministerial Council of the Soviet Zone was requesting Soviet protection against U. S. incendiary bombing. After one day, this propaganda was abruptly omitted from German Communist propaganda, but was followed by the charge that the U. S. was releasing toy balloons for reconnaissance in connection with bacteriological warfare. The continuation of attacks of this kind could be a preliminary to interference with U. S. use of the Berlin air corridors or may be intended as a preliminary buildup for justification of the formation of an East German Air Force. There have been some other recent indications of preparations for such an air force, including a report that directions have been issued to seek qualified German aviators for the People's Police.

c. There have been several recent attempts by the Soviets to tighten their control in Austria and to weaken the influence of the Austrian government in the Soviet Zone. Soviet actions have included the following: a refusal to accept 500 new gendarmes for the Soviet Zone, stating that Soviet troops would guarantee internal security; an order for the confiscation of police rifles in one district just outside Vienna followed by an indication that this order would also be applied in other areas of the Soviet Zone; an announcement by one Soviet commander that the execution of certain Austrian laws would be subject to his approval; and an announcement that a Soviet observer would henceforth attend all sessions of the provincial cabinet of Lower Austria. Despite these developments, there has been no indication that the Soviets intend to assume complete political control in their zone by force.

d. Extensive coverage of Hungary has continued to reveal no reliable evidence of a build-up of Soviet troops although construction of new and permanent barracks continues. Combined Soviet-Hungarian Army training has been noted. Mining in the restricted zone along the Yugoslav border is considered probable.

e. all or most of a Soviet artillery supply depot in Austria is to be moved to an unknown location in Hungary during the month of August. It is believed most probable that this transfer is intended to improve logistical support for Soviet units in Hungary, heretofore supplied from Austria. The possibility exists, however, that this movement could be intended to establish a supply depot for an attack on Yugoslavia. 2

f. Reports of a large concentration of Soviet and Rumanian forces in Bucovina have been received, locations unspecified. Bucovina is partially in the U.S.S.R. and partially in Rumania. Although no Rumanian units are believed to be in this area, there is normally a sizeable concentration of Soviet forces in the Carpathian Military

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District which includes Bucovina. A buildup of Soviet forces in this area could be a preliminary to a move into Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Rumania, but there is as yet no confirmation of increased troop strength in the area.

g. There has been no additional information on conservation of fuel supplies in Germany or Rumania, reported last week. The Soviet press has announced a steady increase in oil production at the Baku fields during July, and Soviet oil production in Austria is reliably reported to be nearing a record mark. It would thus appear that conservation measures are not generally necessitated by lagging production but do reflect increased storage.

h. After several weeks of unusually strong propaganda against Iran, the U.S.S.R. has suddenly taken a more friendly attitude than heretofore, and is apparently willing to make concessions in return for negotiation of a trade agreement with Iran. There is no indication of what trade concessions the U.S.S.R. may seek, but oil exploration rights are a distinct possibility. The U. S. Senior Military Attache recently visited the northern Iranian border and reported no indications of an imminent attack.

i. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There is no conclusive evidence of imminent hostilities against Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East.
- (2) There are continuing indications of preparation for such action, particularly logistical activity.
- (3) An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.

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